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AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF
THE STATE AND ITS RELATION TO
THE CRIMINAL LAW
By G. P. J. McGINLEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
It seems paradoxical that Bentham, Austin, Kelsen and Hart should hold
such pessimistic views on the nature of man, government and the state that
they would believe that self-seeking individuals in the community will strive
to fulfill themselves and often achieve that fulfillment with the aid of wicked
immoral laws.' The apparent paradox lies in the fact that even with such views,
these positivist thinkers advance a philosophy of law that legitimates the laws
in question. There is, however, no paradox. It is because of these perceptions
that the positivist school exists, and it is the positivists' refusal to distort these
views for short-term ideological goals 2 that gives positivism its claim to being a
school of jurisprudence of radical realism.3 In a broad sense this paper is an
attempt to articulate some of the presuppositions of positivist thought. It deals
with the forces of cohesion within the state institution, that lead to the main-
tenance of its authority and hence its power over the society that it governs.
More specifically, however, the paper deals with the peculiar relation of these
forces to criminal law.
The paper is in three parts. The first deals with the views of those jurists
© Copyright, 1981, G.P.J. McGinley.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Tennessee. The author would like to
thank the Board of Trustees of Columbia University Law School whose support of the
author with a fellowship encouraged the preparation of this paper.
1 Bentham's whole theory of utility seems to be based on the psychological view
that man is a hedonistic egoist seeking after pleasure and avoiding pain: see Bentham,
An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. Burns and Hart (Lon-
don: Athlone, 1970) at 11; as to governments, Bentham considered them little better
than bands of robbers preying on those over whom they had power: Bentham, "Plan of
Parliamentary Reform," in 3 The Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. Bowring (New York:
Russell & Russell, 1962) 433 at 451-58; Austin, of course, shared many of the views
of his mentor Bentham: Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (London:
Lowe & Brydone, 1965) at 16, 185, 272; Kelsen thought that the idea that man could
return to nature was based on the misconception that man is naturally good: Kelsen,
What is Justice? (Berkeley: Univ. of Cal. Press, 1957) at 241; as to the idea of a
collective unity in the state, Kelsen thought this to be no more than a facade that self-
seeking interests used for their own purposes: Kelsen, General Theory of Law and the
State, trans. Wedberg (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1949) at 184-85; Hart
is more charitable on the nature of man: Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Claren
don, 1961) at 191; however, he does believe that "[w]icked men will enact wicked rules
which others will enforce": op. cit. at 206.
2 The basic premise of cognitive jurisprudence is that to make any reforms in the
legal system it is necessary to demonstrate what the system is actually doing. See,
Llewellyn, Jurisprudence (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1968) at 55-56.
3 Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law. Its Method and Fundamental Concepts (1934),
50 L.Q. Rev. 474 at 482.
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who assert that criminal conduct is generally to be determined by its ethical
disvalue. This school of thought, represented by Hall,4 and more recently,
Fletcher,5 will be called, for want of a more appropriate label, the moralist
school. This initial inquiry is not designed to deny that criminal conduct can
be, or generally is, immoral and harmful. Rather, it is designed to show that
the moralists' focus on the attributes of immorality and harm is volitional in
that it is an attempt on their part to impose a moral brake on the force in the
state institution that leads its officials to punish any conduct that challenges
the state's authority. In so focusing, however, they distort a central feature
of criminal conduct for ideological goals.
The second part of the paper develops a cognitive theory of criminal
law. It shows that the inherent feature of all criminal conduct is that it chal-
lenges the authority and hence the power of the state institution; and that it
does this not because of the ethical quality of the act but rather because of
the nature of the law forbidding it. It argues that in its criminal laws the state
most nearly approaches the issuance of a categorical imperative to society.
Criminal laws constitute commands so complete that their conscious contra-
vention cannot, except in the rarest of circumstances, be contemplated. The
explication of this thesis involves an inquiry into the nature of the state and
the forces of cohesion that function within it. It will be argued that these forces
operate to give the state entity, whatever its polity, its unique telos, namely,
the maintenance of its authority and hence its power over the society that it
governs. Criminal conduct contradicts this telos and, therefore, activates the
forces that operate to maintain it.
The fundamental task from the perspective of a cognitive inquiry, there-
fore, is to determine the strength of the state's telos on the judicial organ of
the state. This is the subject of the third part of the paper. It will be argued
that while reason and morality, together with the judiciary's own interests in
maintaining its authority vis-a-vis the other organs of the state, will somewhat
retard the state's impetus to vindicate its authority, the substantive rules of the
criminal law indicate nevertheless that the restraints are not as strong as the
moralist school would have us believe.
II. THE MORALIST SCHOOL OF THOUGHT
Kelsen believed that every doctrine of natural law had its roots in voli-
tion rather than cognition and that when theorists of this school purport to
explain the existing order they rather work to deny its reality., Kelsen's pro-
position is nowhere more apparent than in the criminal law theory of the
moralist school. This is due, in part, to an almost irresistible impulse toward
what Hayek called constructivist rationalization-the tendency to postulate
theories in universal terms so as to purport to encompass all relevant empirical
data.7 It is also, however, based on the remarkable faith natural law thinkers
4 Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law (2d ed. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,
1960) at 146.
5 Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Toronto: Brown, 1978) at 467.
6 Kelsen (1949), supra note 1, at 11.
7 Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1976).
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seem to place in the capacity of ideas to influence human conduct; for example,
believing that if judges are told frequently enough that immoral laws are not
laws, they will eventually act in accordance with that principle.8 The first step
in the volitional methodology of the school is to postulate a theory of what the
criminal law ought to be. The theory is an abstraction only marginally related
to the power structures within the community. It is a standard of justice that
the state must meet if its laws are to be considered valid. Although this is voli-
tional it is of course legitimately so. The next step, however, is to explain the
positive law in terms of the abstraction-to imperceptibly elide "ought" to
"is." ' ) This, of course, creates a distortion. It is, however, a useful distortion
for once it is understood, it begins to highlight the very features it wishes to
deny. It is to this end that the general theory of the moralist school will be
considered.
The first premise of moralist thinking is that criminal punishment is
morally justified only when the defendant is morally culpable.', What is per-
ceived to be morally culpable, of course, varies with each theorist. Thus, Hall
argues that punishment is valid only where the defendant voluntarily or reck-
lessly committed a proscribed harm.11 Fletcher argues that punishment is
valid only in cases of wrongdoing that threaten or violate legal interests and
that may properly be attributed to the defendant. 12 These tests, while superfi-
cially clear, really explain little or nothing about criminal culpability. As
8 See Hart (1961), supra note 1, at 205. See also Hart, Positivism and the Separa-
tion of Law and Morals (1958), 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593; Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity
to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart (1958), 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630 on the issue whether
positivism facilitated and natural law could have prevented Nazi excesses. Similarly,
Fletcher argues that positivism "inhibits scholarly inquiry into the nature of criminal
law and encourages legislatures to remake the criminal law according to their will.":
Fletcher, supra note 5, at 408. Similarly, criminal law as an institution of blame and
punishment will be taken seriously only when "theorists turn to the criminal law as a
body of ideas and practices with a reality deeper than the positive proscriptions of
courts and legislators.": op. cit. at 467. Hall is aware of the tendency to elide general
principles: Hall, supra note 4, at 2. He goes on to say, however, that the subject matter
of his treatise is the existing law: loc. cit.
9 Hume notes the tendency of the moralist school of thought to elide "is" to
"ought" without explanation of the new relation: Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature,
ed. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon, 1888) at 469. Here the process is in the reverse,
wherein the given theory gains support from the asserted empirical reference.
10 Fletcher, supra note 5, at 461-62, 800: "[P]unishment ought to be inflicted ac-
cording to the offender's desert..."; Hall, supra note 4, at 95, 243; 1 The Complete
Works of Edward Livingston on Criminal Jurisprudence, ed. (New York: National
Prison Association of U.S.A., 1873) at 235: "[M]oral guilt must be united to injury in
order to justify punishment."; Allen, Retribution in Model Penal Law: The Principle of
Aggravated Harm (1975), 25 Buff. L. Rev. 1 at lln. 32 citing Durham v. U.S., 214
F.2d 862 at 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954) citing, Holloway v. U.S., 148 F.2d 665 at 666-67
(D.C. Cir. 1945): "Our collective conscience does not allow punishment where it can-
not impose blame."; Hall, Negligent Behavior Should He Excluded From Penal Liabil-
ity (1963), 63 Colum. L. Rev. 632 at 636: "[nlo one should be punished unless he has
clearly acted immorally, i.e., he voluntarily harmed someone...."
11 Hall, supra note 4, at 146.
12 Fletcher, supra note 5, at 472, 473, 790.
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Hume has pointed out, wrongness is not an intrinsic quality,13 nor is harm.
Conduct is not wrong or harmful in itself; it is deemed to be wrong or deemed
to be harmful by a person applying certain standards, having particular values
or protecting certain interests. From a volitional perspective, therefore, the
ultimate question is what criteria should the perfect adjudicator apply when
dealing with conduct alleged to be criminal.
This, of course, is a central question in ethico-legal discourse. 14 Two
broad tests ultimately emerge: 1) common or anthropological morality (what
the community actually thinks) and 2) critical or discriminatory morality (what
the community ought to think).15 What is important about these tests is that
they both present a standard that the state must meet if its criminal law is to
be legitimate. They implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, deny that the state as
an institution has any interest in enforcing criminal laws simply on the basis
that the act challenged its authority and hence the authority of its func-
tionaries. Thus one finds statements to the effect that the wrong or harm to
the state involved in criminal conduct is a purely formal concept.10
Although it is not entirely clear, both Hall and Fletcher probably support
a test of critical morality.'1 This test gains a certain tactical advantage for the
13 Hume, supra note 9. Hume, of course, believed that moral distinctions are de-
rived from a feeling of satisfaction in the contemplation of virtue and uneasiness in the
presence of vice. This sense was, according to Hume, ultimately based on the concept
of utility: op. cit. at 471.
14 See Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1965);
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977); Hart, Law, Liberty and
Morality (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1968).
15 Dworkin draws this distinction between anthropological and discriminatory mo-
rality. Anthropological morality is whatever attitudes a group displays about the right-
ness or wrongness of various forms of behaviour and may be based on prejudices,
personal taste, arbitrary standards, etc.: Dworkin, id. at 248. Discriminatory morality
is, however, based on reason, i.e., "moral principles that underlie the community's
institutions and laws."; id. at 80.
10 Fletcher refers to the incompatibility of the act with the norms of the legal sys-
tem as a purely formal concept: Fletcher, supra note 5, at 458. Similarly, Hall refers
to the inchoate offences (which are in fact, as will be seen, pure attacks on the state)
as merely formal offences: Hall, supra note 4, at 220. Other moral theorists make
similar comments. See Eser, The Principle of "Harm" in the Concept of Crine: A
Comparative Analysis of the Criminally Protected Interests (1965), 4 Duquesne L. Rev.
345 at 348; Mueller, Criminal Theory: An Appraisal of Jerome Hall's Studies in Juris-
prudence And Criminal Theory (1959), 34 Ind. L.J. 206 at 220.
17 Hall makes reference to the communities' "freely derived values": Hall, supra
note 4, at 163; and the "conscience of the community": op. cit. at 164. He admits how-
ever, that "[a] particular community's attitudes are sometimes at odds with its values, as
is often acknowledged by its more enlightened members.": op. cit. at 216. But he does
not say how and when, if ever, this enlightened view is to be considered in terms of
culpability if the penal laws are ultimately the best evidence of moral values. See op. cit.
at 164. Fletcher is more obscure; he argues that wrongdoing is "a subtle problem of
moral judgment," and that the incompatibility of the act with the norms of the legal
system is a "purely formal concept.": Fletcher, supra note 5, at 458. He calls for a
criterion of "transcendent notion of wrongdoing": op. cit. at 790, but ultimately he
would validate (in most cases) the punishment of acts of conscience contrary to valid
legal prohibitions: op. cit. at 86.
270 [VOL. 19, No. 2
Criminal Law and the State
moralist position in that it appears to draw support from the community with-
out being tied to any particular view the majority may have.' 8 This is fortunate
from the moralist perspective because there is nothing to indicate that a society
would be unwilling to punish conduct that was harmless but that irritated it.' 9
In short, therefore, the rational social values test is one that would remove the
ignorance and prejudices of society and the authority and power values of the
state from the determination of what is criminally culpable.
As an ideal, the position that punishment should only follow wrongdoing
that causes or threatens to cause a social harm, as determined by rational
values and standards, is incontrovertible.2 0 It is also, undoubtedly, the rationale
behind the creation of many penal laws. The volitional thrust of the moralist
position, however, leads the moralist to assert that this ideal is in fact the
primary if not the sole reason why penal laws are enforced.21 They would
reject any distinction between the reason for the creation of criminal laws and
the reason for their enforcement. Thus their cognitive interpretation of the
18 Moral theorists make a great deal of the concepts of community values and
community fears. Thus, Hall bases his whole principle of the moral wrong of crime on
the idea that the wrong contravenes the objective morality of the community "as that
is expressed in its penal laws.": Hall, supra note 4, at 164. He never, however, ade-
quately deals with the question why the crimes and standards of liability that he dis-
agrees with should not also reflect the common conscience of the community. See note
16, supra.
Of course, the idea that there are community values or whether they are of any
real value in determining moral guilt is a matter of some debate. See Hart, "Punishment
and the Elimination of Responsibility," in Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford: Ox-
ford Univ. Press, 1968) 158 at 171; Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal Law (1939),
49 Yale L.J. 987; Hughes, Criminal Responsibility (1963), 16 Stan. L. Rev. 470 at 481;
Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence (1941), 55 Harv. L.
Rev. 44 at 46-47. All of these writers cast doubt on the utility of the concept.
Another use to which the community is put is to explain crime in terms of the
harm it causes to the community by the fear that it generates in society. Thus, Nozick
argues that crime can be distinguished from civil wrongs by the fear it produces in the
community. See Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974)
at 65-66. Similarly, Fletcher defines manifest criminality as an external activity that is
unnerving to the community embodied in the hypothetical observer who must be
frightened or perhaps merely suspicious: Fletcher, supra note 5, at 232-33. See also
Mueller, supra note 16. This idea of community fear is such an odd one and so in-
consistent with ordinary perceptions of human nature that one wonders whether it is
seriously put forward. Undoubtedly some crimes will produce fear in the victim. How-
ever, the emphasis that the media and popular entertainment place on recounting and
re-enacting criminal activity indicates that society if anything gains more of a morbid
enjoyment from the more spectacular crimes than fear. Indeed some sociologists claim
that deviant behaviour of this sort benefits rather than harms society in terms of the
social solidarity that is produced by the interest generated. See Durkheim, The Division
of Labor in Society, trans. Simpson (New York: Free Press, 1968) at 70-110; Erikson,
Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance (New York: John Wiles,
1966) at 4.
10 Mead, The Psychology of Punitive Justice (1918), 23 Am. J. Sociology 577.
See also Erikson, id. at 8.
20 It may be asserted, however, that the acceptance of a democratic system of
government requires the rejection of critical morality.
21 This is Devlin's position. See Devlin, supra note 14, at 12. See Fletcher, supra
note 5, at 472; Hall, supra note 4, at 213, 243.
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positive law denies that once a criminal law issues from the state a new and
powerful force emerges for its enforcement and that this force is unrelated to
the moral quality of the forbidden act, but this interpretation is concerned with
its quality as an attack on the authority of the state. It is, of course, the very
existence of this force that leads the moralists to posit their moral criterion in
the first place and leads them, in the second place, to interpret in a manner
consistent with the moralist thesis those cases that highlight its presence.
The cases that indicate the existence of the authoritative force of the
state are those in which defendants are punished, although it is arguable that
they are morally innocent. These can be grouped into four types. First, there
are those involving acts which, though criminal, are performed for a good or
even a heroic motive, such as crimes committed out of religious or political
conviction. 22 Not only might a solid moral defence be made for defendants
engaging in this type of conduct, but their activities might also be said to be
ultimately socially beneficial.2 3 Second, there are crimes malum prohibita
which by definition are not considered to be immoral and in which the
harm is generally the obstruction of some government policy or simply
administrative convenience.24 The third type are those crimes and defences that
require that some external objective standard be met by the defendant. These
crimes, in the words of Allen,
[throw] into the maw of criminal liability persons whose devotion to the moral
postulates of the community is as strong as that of the judges who sentence them
but who, because of defects of perception, judgment, or intelligence, are unable
to reach the levels of care attained by their neighbors. 25
22 Religious beliefs: Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 25 L. Ed. 244 (1878); U.S. v.
Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943); Wong v. State, 192 Ind. 524, 137 N.E. 49 (1922).
Political beliefs: U.S. v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1972); U.S. v. Kroncke, 459
F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1972); U.S. v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied
397 U.S. 910; State v. Marley, 54 Haw. 450, 509 P.2d 1095 (1973); Commonwealth
v. Hall, 322 Mass. 523, 78 N.E.2d 644 (1948); People v. Roberts, 211 Mich. 187, 178
N.W. 690 (1920); State v. Ehlers, 98 N.J.L.R. 236, 119 A. 15 (1922); State v. Gann,
244 N.W.2d 746 (N.D. 1976); Carew v. State, 471 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Cr. App. 1971);
Morgentaler v. The Queen, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 616, 53 D.L.R. (3d) 161, 20 C.C.C. (2d)
449; R. v. Simpson (1915), 84 L.J.K.B. 1893, [1914-15] All E.R. Rep. 917, 11 Cr. Rep.
718; see also Everett v. U.S., 336 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1964); In Re Pres. and Dir. of
Georgetown College 331 F.2d 1000 at 1009n. 18 (D.C. Cir. 1964) cert. denied 377
U.S. 978 (1964); R.L Recreation Center v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 12
A.L.2d 230 (1st. Cir. 1949); State v. Fuller, 203 Neb. 233, 278 N.W.2d 756 (1979).
23 The most serious crimes are sometimes those acts that in the judgment of en-
lightened and heroically unselfish people will best promote the common good,
for example, criticism of the errors of established governments or churches.
The history of martyrs of religion and science amply indicates that acts deemed
criminal at a given time in a given community often turn out to be of the
greatest value for human life.
Cohen, supra note 18, at 996. Might not similar arguments be made of the Vietnam
War protests and many other forms of civil disobedience for social purposes?
24 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 62 L. Ed. 210 (1979), proscribes commercial
transactions in parts of protected birds even though the birds are taken lawfully before
the effective date of the act.
25 Allen, Criminal Law and the Modern Consciousness: Some Observations on
Blameworthiness (1977), 44 Tenn. L. Rev. 735 at 753.
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Finally, there are those crimes of strict and vicarious liability. It will be shown
later26 that all of these offences challenge the authority or power of the state
and are punished essentially for this reason.
Although positions vary with specific offences, there are three basic
approaches adopted by the moralists in response to these cases. One is to as-
sert that these are merely penumbral aberrations that do not detract from the
central thesis that crime involves morally culpable conduct.27 As indicated
above, however, the moralist thesis is not simply an assertion that crime often
involves moral culpability but is also a denial of the significance of the force
of authority within the state itself. These cases, therefore, in reality highlight
the central distinction between positivist and moralist thought. It is precisely
the fact that these acts are morally neutral and yet punishment still results
that indicates there is more to criminal conduct than mere wrongdoing that
causes harm.
Another approach is either to deny that the conduct is criminal, or to
assert that it is immoral. Thus, Hall denies the criminality of negligence and
strict liability offences. 28 Similarly, both Hall and Fletcher occasionally make
statements that are no more than assertions that the conduct is wrong. Thus,
Fletcher states at one point that every proscribed act "is at least a nominal
act of wrongdoing."29 Hall similarly asserts that the knowledge that conduct is
proscribed gives it its moral disvalue 30 This approach reminds one of Kelsen's
proposition that all moral arguments are merely refined and elaborate versions
of "bravo" and "phooey"!31
The third approach is more substantial and is intimately connected with
the concept of harm. Basically it involves the correlation of moral wrongdoing
with the voluntary, reckless or negligent commission of a harm. Thus, Pro-
fessor Hall argues that it is the perpetration of harm that gives those acts per-
formed with a good motive their ethical disvalue.32 Similarly, Fletcher defines
wrongdoing in terms of violations of or threats to legal interests.33 It is clear,
however, that many criminal acts, performed with either good or bad motives,
may produce no harm at all34 (as this term is commonly used) or may in fact
produce a beneficial result. There is the classical example where the defendent
maliciously burns his neighbor's fields and inadvertently causes a fire break
26 See text accompanying notes 92 ff., infra.
27 See Hall, supra note 4, at 95, 220; Wasserstrom, H.L.A. Hart and the Doctrine
of Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibility (1967), 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 92 at 95.
28 Hall, id. at 3-4, 135-39; Hall, Theory and Reform of Criminal Law (1978), 29
Hastings L.. 893 at 897.
2 9 Fletcher, supra note 5, at 458. He admits it may be muted on occasions.
30 Hall, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law (1957), 33 Ind. L.J. 1 at 35-36.
31 Kelsen, supra note 18.
32 Hall, supra note 4, at 95, and Hall quotation, supra note 10.
33 Fletcher, supra note 5, at 473.
34 The inchoate crimes of criminal attempts, solicitations, conspiracy, perjury, for-
gery and possession of burglary tools may all be performed without inflicting any
mental or physical harm. Similarly, crimes of strict liability may occur without produc-
ing any immediate harm or injury other than frustrating government policy.
1981]
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that saves the neighbor's life and property.35 More realistically, however, is
the case for the harmlessness of euthanasia. The victim consents, and needless
pain and suffering are eliminated. The act could be considered beneficial. One
needs to understand, therefore, what is meant by harm in order to see whence
the moral disvalue is derived.
Although the idea of harm is central to moralist thinking, it has become
such an abstract concept that some consider it useless in determining the char-
acteristics of criminal wrongdoing. 6 The abstraction is necessary for the mor-
alist thesis, however, in order to encompass those crimes that produce no im-
mediate injury other than the injury of disobedience to the authority of the
state 37 In order to encompass such crimes, the moralists developed the concept
that the harm of crime is harm to social values and interests.3 8 Values and
interests are then defined in broad terms such as life, property, honour and
reputation.39
The initial difficulty with this concept is in determining how a social value
or interest can be harmed by conduct that merely contradicts it. The idea
seems to be Bentham's notion that if individuals are permitted to engage in
harmful conduct without punishment, then others will also be encouraged to
do so. Thus, the community value in question will be lost.40 Similarly in the
case of inchoate crimes, unless defendants are punished it is assumed they will
continue in their course of conduct and eventually harm the value in question.
This assumption, of course, places a great deal of faith in the criminal law as
the supporter of social mores.
41
If one assumes, however, that values can be harmed, one still does not
know wherein the harm lies in those acts of humanity or of political or moral
conviction that could be said to have produced social benefits. The problem
lies essentially in determining how the social value is to be ascertained so that
a defendant can be judged a saint or sinner. Clearly, in a pluralistic society
there are unlikely to be very many coherent values that are ascertainable. Hall
argues that the values can be determined with certainty only from the penal
law itself.42 Thus the circle closes! Conduct is immoral if it voluntarily causes
harm; it is harmful if it attacks social values; social values can only be deter-
mined with certainty by the penal laws themselves. Therefore conduct is pre-
sumed to be harmful to social values if proscribed. Apart from evidencing an
S5 See Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for
Criminal Liability (1975), 23 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 266 for a discussion of this hypothesis.
36 Drane and Neal, On Moral Justifications for the Tort/Crime Distinction (1980),
68 Calif. L. Rev. 398 at 403-406.
37 Hall, supra note 4, at 218-19.
38 1d. at 215.
39 d. at 215-16; Mueller, supra note 16.
40 Bentham (1961), supra note 1. See also Report of the Royal Commission on
Capital Punishment (Gower's Report) (Cmd. 8932, 1953) at 20, para. 59: "The fact
that men are hung for murder is one great reason why murder is considered so dreadful
a crime."
41 Kelsen believed religion to be a more effective sanctioning system than the legal
order: Kelsen (1949), supra note 1, at 20.
4 2 Hall, supra note 4, at 21.
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almost Kantian faith in the ability of the law to reflect social values, this ra-
tionalization also, of course, collapses the morality-harm distinction.
43
The problems that arise when volitional jurisprudence turns cognitive is
illustrated by what has happened to the harm standard. It is a standard by
which the state is to be restrained. However, the attempt to encompass those
crimes that do not fit within the thesis has made the standard so vacuous that
from a volitional perspective it is no standard at all.
The view advanced thus far is that there are forces in operation in the
state that move to have criminal laws enforced regardless of the ethical or
consequential quality of the contravening conduct. It is suggested that this
perspective is shared by moralist thinkers, and that in order to restrain these
forces they set up standards which they argue must be met if punishment is
to be morally justified. To the same end, however, they deny the significance of
these forces by interpreting those cases that reveal their presence as if they
were either aberrational or consistent with their own thesis. In doing this, they
distort the essential quality of criminal conduct.
The next part puts forward a theory of criminal law that is based on the
nature of the state. It argues that the state is an institution that governs by
maintaining a position of institutional supremacy in the society that it rules.
The states does this by consistently punishing those who challenge that au-
thority. It is able to do this because of the linguistic rule-following tenden-
cies of its officers. For reasons that will be given, state functionaries tend to
activate laws punishing offenders even though they may personally disagree
with those laws. It will be argued that this linguistic rule-following gives the
state its telos for maintaining its societal ascendancy. It will be argued that
criminal conduct attacks this ascendancy not because of the moral or harmful
quality of the act but rather because the law that forbids it puts the state's
authority directly on the line. In order to explicate this theory, it is necessary
to examine first the state itself and then the nature of criminal laws.
III. A COGNITIVE THEORY
The different perceptions of the nature and functioning of the state as
viewed by positivist and natural law thinkers are well illustrated by the fol-
lowing quotation from Fuller:
[Tihe analytical positivist sees law as a one-way projection of authority, emanating
from an authorized source and imposing itself on the citizen. It does not discern
as an essential element in the creation of a legal system any tacit cooperation bet-
ween lawgiver and citizen; the law is seen as simply acting on the citizen-mor-
ally or immorally, justly or unjustly, as the case may be.44
Professor Fuller's observation involves what might be called an ideologi-
43 Fletcher's position is somewhat obscure. He defines wrongdoing in terms of
threatened harm to legal interests: Fletcher, supra note 5, at 472-73. But what is a legal
interest? Is it what the judge or legislature says it is, or is it some external evaluation
of the defendant's conduct? Fletcher never deals with this issue. He asserts that a viola-
tion of any proscription is a nominal case of wrongdoing: op. cit. at 458; and he also
denies an excuse to those who violate valid legal prohibitions: op. cit. 806. But again it
is not clear what this assertion means. This lack of clarity is due primarily to the fact
that Fletcher has no moral or political theory of criminal law: op. cit. at 395 n.2.
44 Fuller, The Morality of the Law (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1963) at 192.
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cal elision common to natural law thinking. He essentially asserts that the
ideological premise on which the political community is based and from which
it draws its legitimacy (in this case democracy) is also the major influential
force within the system; that the state simply mirrors the ideology which sup-
ports it. This movement from the values of the system to its functioning omits
from consideration the operational force of the state itself. This is a force that is
unrelated to the polity of the society in question but that is common to all state
entities. As indicated above, this elision is primarily designed to impose a moral
brake on the force itself, but in so doing it tends to distort the nature of the crim-
inal law. In order to understand the nature of crime, therefore, it is necessary
to view the state without its ideological trappings and to consider in what way
all state entities are able to maintain a position of pre-eminence in society.
The raison d'etre of the state is to govern and in this context it can be
defined as a complex set of institutional arrangements that have developed in
society for that purpose. The institutions operate through the continuously
regulated activities of individuals functioning as office holders.45 The state is
essentially, therefore, the official activities of these office holders. 40 While the
state has appeared in many forms, both autocratic and democratic, and has
pursued various goals, good and bad, and although its authority has been vin-
dicated by a variety of theories, its one constant feature is that in every society
it stands at the apex of power and authority. 47 There is no other authority
within a society that is recognized as its equal. 48 All the business of ruling is
performed either by it, or with its consent. Its functionaries expect and, for
the most part, obtain total obedience to the laws made in its name. 40
45 This definition is taken from Poggi, The Development of the Modern State (Lon-
don: Hutchinson, 1978) at 1. See also Bendix, Nation Ruilding and Citizenship (New
York: Wiley & Sons, 1964) at 129.
46 Austin categorized the state as the "person or body of individual persons, which
bears the supreme powers in an independent political society.": Austin, Lectures on
Jurisprudence (4th ed. London: John Murray, 1885) at 249. Gray defines the state as
"a personified abstraction-it is an idol, a dumb idol whose use is to give a title to its
law-making and judgment-giving priests...": Gray, The Nature and Sources of Law
(New York: MacMillan, 1921) at 70. "[A] State means, conceal it how you will, a lot
of individual selves...": Dicey, Law and Public Opinion (2d ed. London: MacMillan,
1962) at lxxx. See also Malinowski, "Introduction," in Hogbin, Law and Order in
Polynesia (New York: Cooper Square, 1972) xvii at xxxi; Radcliffe-Brown, "Preface,"
in Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, African Political Systems (London: Oxford Univ. Press,
1940) at xxiii: "There is no such thing as the power of the state, there are in reality
powers of individuals."
47 This statement is true when all organs act in toto. Paley, thus, describes the
power of the state in the following terms: "absolute, omnipotent, uncontrollable, arbi-
trary, despotic, and.. . alike so in all countries.": Paley, Moral and Political Philosophy
(New York: Garland, 1978) at 449. Accord, Gray, id. at 70: "The true view seems
to be that the power of the state is unlimited"; at 89: "[C]learly law is at the mercy of
the State."; Laski, Authority in the Modern State (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1919)
at 26-27: "Limitation of any kind it does not.., admit .... [It] has rarely hesitated to
claim paramount authority."; Poggi, supra note 45, at 1: [It] reserves to itself the busi-
ness of rule over a territorial bounded society, it monopolizes, in law and as far as
possible in fact, all faculties and facilities pertaining to that business."
48 Poggi, id. at 117.
49 MacIver, The Web of Government (rev. ed. New York: Free Press, 1965) at
10, 58-59. Merriam, Political Power (New York: Collier, 1964) at 128-29.
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This central feature of all state entities raises a question that is basic to
this part. How is this ascendancy maintained? Ostensibly it is achieved by mo-
nopolizing the means of domination within the community: setting up instru-
ments of coercion and punishment backed by a centrally directed, permanent
military force in the hands of the principal government. 50 The mere creation
of instruments of coercion cannot, however, explain their constant functioning.
Even from its early beginnings, the state must have been an institution of some
complexity,5' involving many officers that the personal charisma or threats of
the rulers could not always be expected to influence. Nor could the daily ac-
tivities of administration and government be constantly supervised and directed
by those in power. As the state grew in size and complexity, actual power over
the activities of these proliferating and ever-changing functionaries diminished
as the chain of command lengthened. 52 Despite this growth, and despite the
fact that these functionaries could not always be expected to share similar
values and views, states maintain this telos of retaining the supremacy of
power. That this retention occurs in every society, whatever its political struc-
ture or underlying values, indicates that there must be strong cohesive forces
operating on the individual members of the state's institutions that lead them
to obey the rules requiring them to punish those who question the authority of
the state. What then are the forces that lead these officers to obey the rules
that give the state its unity of purpose? Putting the question in the context of
Professor Fuller's observation, what would lead state functionaries (judicial
or otherwise) to act on an order requiring them to bring about the punishment
of someone who had challenged the institution's authority despite the fact
that the conduct was neither immoral nor harmful?
The answer to this question must lie initially in the explanations given
for the general phenomenon of obedience to authority, and particularly obed-
ience to the authority of the state. Empirical research by psychologists re-
veals an alarming propensity in people to obey commands of an authority
figure, even to the extent of inflicting serious pain on innocent victims.53 This
revelation tends to support the thesis of some thinkers that obedience to the
state has become an instinct inbred in the human race by countless ages of
subservience to its authority.54 Indeed the Scandinavian realists assert that in
50 Max Weber listed the pre-conditions on which the modern Western state is based
as the monopolization of means of domination. The conditions consist of the creation
of a centrally directed and permanent system of taxation; the creation of a centrally
directed and permanent military force in the hands of a central governmental authority;
monopolization of legal enactments and the legitimate use of force by the central author-
ity and the organization of a rationally oriented officialdom, whose exercise of adminis-
trative functions is dependent upon the central authority. See Bendix, Max Weber
(Garden City: Doubleday, 1962) at 383.
61 See Diamond, Primitive Law Past and Present (London: Methuen, 1971).
52 Bell, Power, Influence and Authority (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1975) at
87.
.3 Milgram, Obedience to Authority (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1974). It is
interesting to note in this regard that other researchers have found more resistance to
authority in children. Piaget, The Moral Judgement of the Child, trans. Gabain (Lon-
don: Routledge & K. Paul, 1972) at 275-94.
54 Bay, "Civil Disobedience Prerequisite for Democracy in Mass Society," in
Hanson and Fowler, Obligation and Dissent (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971) at 30; Maine,
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reality there are no rules but simply habitual behaviour accompanied by a feel-
ing of being bound to obey authority.56
If there is such an instinct to obey authority, there is no reason to as-
sume that officials-judicial or otherwise-are any more immune to it than
those outside the system. In fact, history has shown that forms of government
can change on a constitutional and legislative level without much change in
judicial or administrative personnel or in the organizations." De facto author-
ity exercised for a sufficient period will become de jure and, as Kelsen has
pointed out, the legal character of the existing political order tends to be pre-
sumed as self-evident by those functioning within it.57
A more specific rationale for obedience given by Raz,58 Dahl5" and Bryce 0
is simple indolence. In the words of Bryce: "To most people, nothing is more
troublesome than the effort of thinking. They are pleased to be saved the ef-
fort. They willingly accept what is given to them because they have nothing
to do further than receive it."'
One merely has to read the works of McDougal and Lasswell to get an
idea of the difficulties and complexities involved in making what they con-
sider to be a socially correct decision. One can then appreciate how much
easier it is to be a linguistic rule-follower. 2
Insofar as possible, one tends to think of officials as industrious, diligent
people, as undoubtedly many of them are. When one considers, however, the
instances of slavish adherence to outmoded rules, one might wonder how
much of this diligence is due to misplaced wisdom and how much is due to the
real difficulty and effort involved in developing a new rule.03 It is interesting,
in this context, to note that Cardozo believed that it was only "when there is
Popular Government (New York: H. Holt and Co., 1886) at 63; Russell, Power (New
York: W.W. Norton, 1933) at 19, 204; Weber, Law in Economy and Society, ed.
Rheinstein (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1954) at 328.
55 Hdgerstrim, Inquiries Into the Nature of Law and Morals, ed. Olivecrona, trans.
Broad (Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell, 1953); Lundstedt, Legal Thinking Revised
(Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell, 1956); Olivecrona, Law As Fact (London: Stevens,
1939).
56 See Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke N.O., [1969] 1 A.C. 645, [1968] 3 All E,R.
561, [1968] 3 W.L.R. 1229 (P.C.). For the capitulation of the Rhodesian High Court
to the new order; see also Hopton, Grundnorm and Constitution: The Legitimacy of
Politics (1978), 24 McGill L.J. 72; see also Ebenstein, The Pure Theory of Law: De-
mythologizing Legal Thought (1971), 59 Cal. L. Rev. 617 at 648 for a comment on
the fourth Weimar Republic.
57 Kelsen, supra note 3, at 484.
58 Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979) at 25.
59 Dahl, After the Revolution (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1970) at 8.
60 Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon, 1901) at 469.
61 ld.
G2 Lasswell & McDougal, Criteria for a Theory About Law (1970-71), 44 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 362 at 390-94.
63 See LaFave & Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law (St. Paul: West, 1972) at
266-67, 534 for statements that judges still apply the year and a day rule for homicide.
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no decisive precedent, that the serious business of the judge begins,"' and
that nine-tenths, perhaps more, of the cases that come before the courts are
predetermined "by inevitable laws that follow them from birth to death." 6'5
Two additional reasons given for obedience are deference and fear. Def-
erence is the tendency to assume that the individual or group issuing the com-
mand has greater wisdom or more expertise than the recipient.00 Another
form that deference can take is in the assumption that the process by which
a rule or decision is made ensures that the decisions themselves will be com-
petently made. 7 The refusal of the federal courts to consider the wisdom of
legislative enactments is probably due in part to this aspect of obedience.6 s
Insofar as fear is concerned, great emphasis is placed on the fact that many
officials cannot be dismissed from office and, therefore, are supposed to be
immune from this sort of pressure. Fear, however, need not be simply of loss
of office. It may be generated by the fear of displeasing or of losing the re-
spect of one's colleagues by a mistaken innovation.69 This sort of pressure is
recognized by the moralist thinkers when they support judges who move
courageously in the face of legislative enactments. 70
Apart from the factors that generally lead people to obey instructions
rather than to follow their personal inclinations, there are two considerations
that operate specifically on individuals who are functionaries of the state. One
is that the legitimacy of official action is derived in part from its impartial,
unbiased application. 71 This factor, of course, will lead to a studied disregard
of person and circumstance by officials, and this disinterest in turn will lead
to a mode of thinking that ignores personal feelings in all cases---even those
where justice might require one to act contrary to the rule in question. The
second reason for official rule-following is connected with the transference of
authority from the state to the official. As one political scientist puts it:
Even the smallest functionary or bureaucrat clothes himself with the importance
attaching to the system he helps to administer, seeking to impress on those who
need its services the sense of their dependence on the agent who renders them. So
from the least to the greatest the institutional system lends to those who superin-
tend it a dignity and worth not their own.7 2
64 Cardozo, The Growth of the Law (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1924) at 60.
Or Id.
66 Bryce, supra note 60.
67 Dahl, supra note 59.
68 Tribe, American Constitutional Law (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation, 1978) at 451-
53.
69 Empirical research indicates that institutional pressures on judges are not insig-
nificant and hence they have a tendency to agree more than disagree. See Grossman,
Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decisions: Notes for a Theory (1967), 29 J. Pol. 334;
Grossman, Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decision-Making (1965-66), 79 Harvard
L. Rev. 1551. See also Austin, 2 Lectures on Jurisprudence, ed. Campbell (5th ed.
London: John Murray, 1885) at 647.
7o See Eser, supra note 16, at 355.
71 See Bendix, supra note 50, at 481-86.
72 MacIver, supra note 49, at 36. See also id. at 430; Maine, Ancient Law (3d ed.
London: John Murray, 1866).
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Thus the officials have a vested interest in maintaining the authority that ele-
vates them above their fellow citizens. Also, they tend to operate in a way
that will check assaults on the authority through which they derive their own
status. By defending their personal authority, they feed the overall authority
of the state. This tendency to defend authority when it is challenged probably
lies at the base of those constitutions that distribute power between various
organs of the state. The hope is that in defending the authority of a particular
organ against the encroachments of the others, the state as a whole will be
restrained from unduly oppressing the society it governs.
The tendency to love power and dignity even though it is not derived
through personal merit will be even stronger in higher level functionaries. As
Russell has pointed out, these people strive to achieve these high positions
precisely because they tend to love power more than others do.73
Against such inducements towards linguistic rule-following by officials,
the moralist school would pit morality and reason. These are both, of course,
two-edged swords that can work in favour of strict rule-following as well as
against it. It would be just as wrong to deny their influence on functionaries as
it is to ignore those features of official behaviour that led Austin to deny the
efficacy of moral arguments on the hangman. 74 The volitional goals of moralist
thinking, however, lead them to ignore or deny the authoritarian structure of
the state and of official action and to argue for the moral character of law
precisely in order to increase the strength of the moral influence on the state's
officials. It is this tendency that leads them to insist that crime is essentially
moral wrongdoing that causes harm, rather than conduct that strikes deeply
at the telos of the state itself.
The position may now be capsulated: it is argued that the state as an
institution has a telos in maintaining its position as the supreme authority in
the society that it governs; that it achieves and maintains this position by
consistently punishing those who question that authority; and that this in turn
is achieved by maintaining forces of coercion and punishment within the
society that are operated by officials, who for the reasons given, tend to be
linguistic rule-followers who will activate those instruments of coercion and
punishment against individuals who challenge the state's institutional position.
To the extent that reason and morality have an impact on official activity-
against upholding the authority of the state-they will tend to weaken the
state's superior position. As the state consistently maintains its ascendant
position, however, one can assume that the forces in favour of the telos are
stronger than those that operate against it.
The third part of this paper examines the extent to which the judiciary,
traditionally the most independent members of the state organization, act as a
moral brake against the thrust of these forces. Before doing this, however, it
is necessary to consider the particular relation criminal laws bear to the state's
authority.
73 Russell, supra note 54, at 161.
74Austin, Province of Jurisprudence Determined (New York: Humanities Press,
1965) at 185.
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Historically, criminal laws emerged with the early state and, interestingly
enough, focused primarily on acts questioning the authority of its head in the
form of breaches of the King's peace. 78 As the vindication for the exercise of
power by the state changed from the divine right of kings to the democratic
rights of the people, so too did criminal conduct become ostensibly offences
against the people. At all times, however, whatever the immediate rationale
for power, the offence is essentially an offence against the state's authority.
Clearly the state is much more concerned with the enforcement of its criminal
laws than with its civil laws. The enforcement of the latter is left primarily in
the hands of the injured party to institute the proceedings and to execute the
judgment. This usually occurs no matter how socially harmful or immoral the
breach may have been.70 With the criminal law, on the other hand, the posi-
tion is reversed. Not only does the state maintain a police force whose primary
purpose is to ensure that its criminal laws are obeyed, but it also prosecutes
and punishes on its own initiative. 77 It does so whether there is a victim,78
whether that victim has been compensated, or has subsequently condoned
the harm79 or whether the defendant has been punished civilly or even
criminally (by another state entity) for the conduct in question. ° The
state, in fact, acts to all intents and purposes as if it were the injured party.
The perceived injury is not derived from the harm to any victim or moral
wrongdoing of the defendant, as the former may not be present and the de-
fendant may have been sanctioned for the latter. It is, of course, the thesis of
this article that the wrong and harm is to the state as an institution of govern-
ment. The harm lies in the fact that criminal conduct challenges the institution-
al supremacy of the state by questioning its authority. This challenge occurs
because criminal laws are commands issuing from the state to the society, and
these commands, unlike other laws, grant no choice in whether they should
be obeyed. If choice is exercised where none is given, the authority by which
the state governs is damaged unless the power on which that authority is
based is exerted against the defendant. Criminal conduct activates the institu-
tional forces that exist in the state to maintain that authority.8'
In order to explicate the significance of criminal conduct as a direct at-
75 Diamond, supra note 51, at 273; Holdsworth, 2 A History of English Law (4th
ed. London: Methuen, 1927) at 50-51; Pollock and Maitland, The History of English
Law (2d ed. Cambridge: The Univ. Press, 1898) at 22.
7 6 LaFave & Scott, supra note 63, at 10-13.
77 Bass Angler Sportsman Soc'y v. U.S. Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412, afl'd., 447
F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1971); Eacret v. Holmes, 215 Ore. 121, 333 P.2d 741 (1958).
Some theorists distinguish crime from civil wrong on the basis of the state's execution
of the court's judgment without being moved to do so. See Pollock, The Distinguishing
Mark of Crime (1959), 22 Mod. L. Rev. 495.
78 This is true with inchoate crimes, offences against public morality and public
welfare offences.
79 Chick v. Wingo, 387 F.2d 330 (6th Cir. 1967); Gilbert v. U.S., 359 F.2d 285
(9th Cir. 1966); Hess v. State, 4 Md. App. 508, 243 A.2d 651 (1968); State v. Odom,
86 N.M. 761, 527 P.2d 802 (1974); LaFave & Scott, supra note 63, at 408-13.
80 U.S. v. Vaughan, 491 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1974); U.S. v. Finley Coal Co., 345
F. Supp. 62 (E.D. Ky. 1972).
81 See text accompanying note 50, supra.
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tack on the ascendant position of the state over society, it is necessary to in-
dicate how the authority is raised and challenged. In one sense authority de-
fines its own parameters in that it cannot be questioned until it is first exerted.
This principle is illustrated by the implications raised by the reverse of the max-
im nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege. Thus the state cannot punish when it
has not proscribed; but by the same token, its authority cannot be questioned
until it has proscribed. In this sense the correlation between disobedience and
criminal conduct is indicated by the fact that one cannot commit a nonexis-
tent crime because one cannot question non-exerted authority.8
2
How then is authority exercised? The answer to this extremely difficult
question would seem to be that authority is exercised when a command is
given and the primary reason for obedience is that it was commanded by the
person or entity commanding it.83 This conclusion in turn is indicated by the
categorical nature of the command, coupled with the threat of a sanction for
non-compliance. It should be noted that the mere threat or imposition of a
sanction does not necessarily indicate that authority has been either raised or
challenged. A choice may still have been given even though a penalty was
threatened or imposed. The following examples will illustrate the propositions:
The defendant is told that if he does X he will suffer sanction B. Defendant does
X. In doing X the defendant was not questioning the authority of the entity im-
posing the penalty because the entity impliedly gave him a choice. In doing X all
the defendant did was to raise questions about the efficacy of the penalty B in in-
ducing people not to do X.
Let us now assume that the defendant is commanded never to do X on pain
of penalty B. In this instance the defendant is given no choice as to whether to
do X or not, so that in doing X, he not merely raises questions as to the efficacy
of penalty B in preventing X but, more important, he challenges the authority of
the commanding entity to forbid him to do X-penalty or no penalty. In doing
this he indicates that the command is not a sufficient reason for its obedience and,
therefore, challenges the authority of the commanding entity to issue the command
itself.
Although the distinction is a subtle one, it is vital in distinguishing civil from
criminal wrongs. With civil wrongs, a penalty is threatened but only to give
the defendant a reason for not choosing to perpetrate the wrong.8 In other
words, the defendant is still given a choice, so that exercise of the choice does
not question the state's authority. The difference is probably best illustrated
in the distinction between civil and criminal contempt. With civil contempt,
the defendant has the choice of complying with the plaintiff's order or endur-
ing the penalty. The presence of choice is highlighted by the fact that once
the defendant complies with the order, the penalty is removed. With criminal
contempt, on the other hand, the defendant either directly questions the
court's authority by conduct that scoffs at it in court, or, by some other con-
duct somehow indicates to the court that the defendant is not simply resisting
82 Zaimi v. US., 155 A.D.C. 66, 476 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
83 See Bell, supra note 52, at 39, Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford: Blackwell, 1960) at
166; Lucas, The Principles of Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966) at 16; Raz,
supra note 58, at 13-15.
84 Bell, supra note 83, at 37.
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the plaintiff but is questioning the authority of the court to issue the com-
mand. s5 In that situation, the penalty is categorically imposed.
Some theorists have suggested that the criminal law also presents a choice
to the defendant in that he can commit the offence if he is prepared to endure
the penalty. s This line of reasoning fails to draw the distinction between
having a choice and being given one. The state clearly does not give a choice
whether to commit a crime, although such a choice must necessarily exist for
an act of disobedience to occur. That the state does not give a choice is indi-
cated by two factors. First, the state maintains a police force, one of whose
primary purposes is to stop people from breaking the criminal law. Crimes
must be performed surreptitiously not simply because they will be punished
but also because they will be prevented if anticipated. This limitation applies
to all crimes from the largest to the smallest. Purely civil wrongs, on the other
hand, can ordinarily be performed openly and with impunity no matter
how harmful or immoral they may be. The second indicator of the absence
of a given choice is the fact that the state will punish those who even attempt
to perpetrate the more serious offences. Attempt is, in fact, a pure exercise in
disobedience. It is for this reason that the general concept of attempt is not to
be found in the civil law. If a choice is given, attempting to exercise it cannot
be a wrong to the state or to any unharmed plaintiff.
The nature of a crime may now be stated: criminal conduct is that con-
duct which challenges the authority of the state by contravening a categorical
imperative wherein the state demands obedience on the basis that the state
itself has commanded obedience. Conduct that is contrary to such a command
attacks the state in its major motivational force, namely, the maintenance of
its institutional supremacy in the society that it governs. The nature of the
disobedience will depend on the nature of the command. The command may
be to engage in, or to refrain from, certain conduct; it may be to be aware of
certain facts, or to maintain a particular standard of care. Clearly, intentional
acts or omissions will attack the authority of the state regardless of any good
motive with which they may have been done. However, failing to be aware
of a command or failing to be aware that one's conduct does not meet a re-
quired standard of alertness challenges the position of the state as surely as do
direct attacks. Apart from a direct challenge, authority tends to be jealous of
its position and will bear down heavily on suspected infringements. It is some-
what ironic, in this regard, that crimes of strict liability are in reality the crimes
that come closest to a categoric imperative in the Kantian sense, admitting few
defences to their contravention.
Thus far an attempt has been made to show that moralist thinking, as
with positivist thinking, is concerned with the forces of cohesion that function
within the state for the maintenance of the state's supreme position within the
85 Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 55 L. Ed. 797 (D.C.C.A.
1911).
86 DeBoisblanc, The Dilemma of the Disobedient: A Solution (1966-67), 41 Ind.
L. J. 521 at 524; Hart, "Legal Responsibilities and Excuses," in Punishment and Re-
sponsibility, supra note 18, at 44.
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society that it governs. The moralists are concerned to restrain this force with
a moral, intellectual brake, but in so doing they distort the nature of the opera-
tion of the force on the state and the significance of that force to the criminal
law. Criminal conduct is conduct that challenges the state's authority not
because of its intrinsic quality but rather because of the nature of the law that
it contravenes. The third part of this paper will examine the extent to which
the judiciary has acted as a moral brake on the state's telos. This inquiry
essentially involves an investigation of the imperative at its weakest point-
acceptable defences. The maintenance of the state's authority will obviously
be strengthened by an attitude of stringency towards defences and it will be
weakened by a liberality towards them. Thus, by examining judicial attitudes
towards defences one will be able to gauge the effectiveness of morality as a
restraint on the ascendant thrust of the state.
Before dealing with this inquiry, however, one last point must be made.
It might be thought that this interpretation of the nature of crime should be
evidenced by one similar response in criminal punishment. If there is only one
sin which is cardinal-disobedience-then there should only be a cardinal
punishment--death. There have been instances in history when the standard
of punishment has not been far from this point.87 Apart from these instances,
there are two responses to this argument. First, there is nothing illogical in
having grades of disobedience; the fact that one act is considered more serious
than another does not detract from the seriousness of the latter. Second, in one
sense the state does treat all criminals in the same way. It stigmatizes them
with the conviction itself. Although it has been pointed out that a conviction
involves certain material disadvantages,88 some commentators believe the
conviction itself is the essence of criminal punishment.8 9
IV. THE JUDICIAL MAINTENANCE OF THE STATE'S AUTHORITY
From the perspective of morality the judicial attitude towards the cate-
goric imperative of the criminal law has not been impressive. Malum prohibita
offences haVe been permitted to proliferate. "' Punishment, sometimes severe,
87 Colquhoun, A Treatise On the Police of the Metropolis (6th ed. London: Bald-
win & Son, 1800) at 437, lists about 160 capital offences in England in the eighteenth
century.
88 Cohen and Rivkin, Civil Disabilities: The Forgotten Punishment (1971), 35 Fed.
Prob. 19 at 20.
89 Gardner, Bailey v. Richardson and the Constitution of the United States (1953),
33 B.U. L. Rev. 176 at 181, 193.
90 See Note, Corporate Crime: Regulating Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions
(1979), 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1227 at 1229n. 5, for indicators of the increasing use of
criminal sanctions to enforce regulatory statutes. See also Naftalis, White Collar Crimes
(Philadelphia: A.L.I., A.B.A., 1980). Similarly, courts indicate that the legislatures have
great latitude in determining what shall be criminal. See e.g., U.S. v. Vargas, 380 F.
Supp. 1162 (1974); State v. Scofield, 7 Ariz. App. 307, 438 P.2d 776 (1968); People
v. Anderson, 6 Cal.3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406 U.S.
958 (1972); U.S. v. Moses, 339 A.2d 46, cert. denied, 426, U.S. 920 (D.C. 1975);
Mallory v. State, 91 Idaho 914, 435 P.2d 254 (1967); People v. Wedlow, 17 Mich.
App. 134, 169 N.W.2d 145 (1969).
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has continually been imposed in cases of strict and vicarious liability.9 1 Ob-
jective standards have been imposed on those who may have been unable to
meet them.9 2 Neutral terminology has needlessly been read in favor of author-
ity rather than of individual culpability.9 3 Good motive and innocent mistake
alike have on occasions been ignored.
94
While these tendencies are unfortunate from a moral viewpoint, from
the perspective of authority they indicate that the cohesive forces in the state
are in fact functioning to maintain its telos. The true strength of the impera-
tive, however, is best tested at its weakest point-the general defences of the
criminal law. It is here that the state is foregoing punishment and, presumably,
weakening its authority and hence its power.
The initial significance of the general defences lies in the fact that they
91 E.g., U.S. v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 44 L. Ed.2d 489, rev'ing 499 F.2d 839 (1975);
Morissette v. U.S., 342 U.S. 246, 96 L. Ed. 288 (1952).
Vicarious liability for acts of employees: e.g., Morissette, op. cit.; U.S. v. Harry
L. Young & Sons, 464 F.2d 1295 (10th Cir. 1972); State v. Barry, 255 Iowa 1329, 125
N.W.2d 833 (1964); Commonwealth v. Minicost Car Rental, Inc., 354 Mass. 746, 242
N.E.2d 411 (1968); City of Kansas City v. Hertz Corp., 499 S.W.2d 449 (Mo. 1973);
Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 155 A.2d 825, cert. denied, 363 U.S. 848
(1959).
Significant penalties: e.g., U.S. v. Int'l. Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 29
L. Ed.2d 178 (1971); People v. Wells, 261 Cal.2d 468, 156 P.2d 979, Cal. Rptr. 400
(1945); State v. Hennessy, 114 Wash. 351, 195 P. 211 (1921). See also LaFave &
Scott, supra note 63, at 220n. 12.
92 E.g., U.S. v. Hernandez, 608 F.2d 741 (1979); U.S. v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381 at
387 (7th Cir. 1976), People v. Villegas, 29 Cal. App.2d 658 at 663, 85 P.2d 480 at 482
(1938); Ross v. State, 169 Ind. 388, 82 N.E. 781 (1907); Commonwealth v. Welansky,
316 Mass. 383 at 398-99, 55 N.E.2d 902 at 910 (1944): "But even if a particular
defendant is so stupid... that in fact he did not realize the grave danger [he is guilty
of manslaughter] if an ordinary normal man under the same circumstances would have
realized the gravity of the danger."; State v. Brown, 561 S.W.2d 388 (Mo. 1977);
People v. Strong, 356 N.Y.S.2d 200, 45 N.Y. App. Div. 18 (1974). See also Arizona v.
Starks, 122 Ariz. 531, 596 P.2d 366 (1979); Fuller, supra note 22; Hall, supra note 10,
at 637.
93 Thus, statutes requiring some type of fault, by means of words such as "permits"
or "knowingly," have been interpreted to hold employers liable for conduct that they
were unaware of or had expressly forbidden: see Harry L. Young & Sons, supra note
91; Minicost Car Rentals, supra note 91. Vicarious liability has been imposed where
nothing in the relevant statute indicates that it should. See Morissette, supra note 91.
Neutral terminology has been read as imposing strict liability: e.g., Koczwara, supra
note 91. Knowledge has similarly been interpreted as meaning the capacity to obtain
knowledge: e.g., U.S. v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (9th Cir.
1976); State v. Perkins, 181 La. 997, 160 So. 789 (1935). "Wilfully" has, by the same
token, been interpreted to mean merely intending the act and not intending to violate
the law: e.g., State v. Hall, Idaho 478, 413 P.2d 685 (1966). Similarly, malice has bee'-
construed to mean the intentional performance of the act without lawful justification or
excuse and not as meaning wickedness of mind: e.g., State v. Dunn, 199 N.W.2d 104
(Iowa 1972).
94 Motive: see cases, supra note 22. See also U.S. v. Howard, 504 F.2d 1281 (8th
Cir. 1974), for a recent reaffirmation of the irrelevance of motive. Innocent mistake:
see State v. Einhorn, 213 Kan. 271, 515 P.2d 1036 (1973); Hopkins v. State, 193 Md.
489, 69 A.2d 456 (1950); State v. Goonan, 89 N.H. 528, 3 A.2d 105 (1938); Manahan
v. State, 188 Tenn. 394, 219 S.W.2d 900 (1949).
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constitute a formal exculpation of the defendant's conduct. Accordingly, this
gives them a heightened potential for weakening the state's authority. Because
of this danger, their use has been avoided on occasions and the defendant ex-
culpated in a surreptitious fashion. Such an avoidance may occur outside of
the judicial purview when police and prosecutors fail to act against a parti-
cular breach.e5 It may occur with judicial, connivance when a particular im-
perative has been narrowly interpreted or an exception implied to indicate
that the command was never abrogated. 6 Similarly, the courts have permitted
disobedience to be hidden in a jury acquittal;97 or, they themselves have miti-
gated punishment after the conviction has been secured and the state's author-
ity vindicated. By the same token, courts may attempt to avoid a conflict alto-
gether by imposing hurdles that must be overcome by those who wish to
question the validity of a particular command. 8 This activity is, of course,
morality at work. From the perspective of the defendant the danger of these
methods lies in the uncertainty of their application and efficacy. Insofar as
the state is concerned, they work to maintain its authority by concealing
the fact that disobedient conduct has gone unpunished. With the acceptance
of a defence, however, no concealment occurs, since the state openly admits
that the defendant has in some way abrogated the imperative. It is important,
therefore, for the purpose of gauging the strength of the force of authority
within the state, to determine the extent to which the judiciary is willing to
sustain a general defence.
In order to understand the defences from the perspective of the state, it
is necessary first to articulate two general principles of authority and then to
examine their operation in the context of the judicial function. These prin-
ciples will highlight the operation of authority generally and will also clarify
some of the paradoxes of the defences themselves.
It is clear that the power of authority is inevitably eroded if contravening
conduct is not met with an exercise of that power against the offender. Thus
authority must constantly and vigilantly vindicate itself. It is also clear that
while authority defines its own parameters (in that it cannot be questioned
until exerted), it also, by the same token, determines its own vulnerability.
Because of this second consideration, pragmatism demands that there be recog-
95 Comment, Private Prosecution: A Remedy for District Attorneys' Un warranted
Inaction (1955-56), 65 Yale L.J. 209 at 211-15. Cf., City of Merced v. City of Merced,
240 Cal. App.2d 763 at 766, 50 Cal. Rptr. 287 at 289 (5th Dist. 1966) (duty of prose-
cutor to prosecute regardless of public sentiment); Davis, Discretionary Justice (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1969) at 87.
96 As will be seen, it is a typical judicial technique to narrow the scope of the
command so as to exclude the conduct in question. One method of doing this is to
require specific intent. For a classical example of this, see R. v. Steane, [1947] 1 K.B.
997, [1947] 1 All E.R. 813, 32 Cr. App. Rep. 61 (C.C.A.); see also Browning v. State,
31 Ala. App. 137, 13 So.2d 54 (1943); R. v. Bourne, [1939] 1 K.B. 687 at 695, [1938]
3 All E.R. 615 at 621.
9 7 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 at 153, 20 L. Ed.2d 491 at 498 (1968). See
Kalven & Zeisel, The American Jury (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966); Curtis, The Trial
Judge and the Jury (1951-52), 5 Vand. L. Rev. 150 at 157-58.
98 E.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 27 L. Ed.2d 669; Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S.
77, 27 L. Ed.2d 696; Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 at 19, 14 L. Ed.2d 175 at 191.
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nition that it is gratuitously destructive for authority to expose itself where
disobedience is highly probable 9 It is the interaction between these two prin-
ciples of vindication and vulnerability that produces the pressure-cooker effect
of the criminal law. The first leads the state to bear down heavily on individual
members of society to obey unquestioningly the imperative. The second re-
leases the pressure in narrow and carefully defined circumstances when it is
advantageous to the state to do so. The defences perform this latter function.
The major defences of the criminal law are generally organized into three
categories. First, there are those defences that relate to the defendant's capa-
city to commit a crime. These include; insanity, intoxication and infancy.
Second, there are the defences that constitute an excuse for the offence;
namely, duress, 00 provocation, mistake, consent and entrapment. Finally,
there are defences that are put forward as a justification for the conduct in
question. These are; self defence, defence of others, defence of property, neces-
sity' 01 and acts in furtherance of public and domestic authority.
Capacity, of course, means a capacity to obey. While disobedience is ini-
tially determined by the import of the command it also implies a basic ability
on the part of the defendant to meet its minimum requisites. Some individuals,
therefore, because of temporary or permanent mental or physical disabilities
are ab initio incapable of challenging authority. It is understandable, therefore,
that in clear cases of this sort 0 2 the state has no interest in punishing. While
marginal benefitsle 3 may arise through punishing all objective acts of dis-
obedience, these advantages are offset by the state's need to conserve its forces
of coercion and punishment for use against direct attacks on its authority.
104
Even in these cases, however, application of the first principle of authority is
evident.
Little need be said regarding the defence of infancy because the develop-
ment of a separate system for disciplining juveniles has made it more or less
redundant.105 It should be noted, however, that the defence was not always
available.'08 When it became so, the state pressed its claim for obedience at
the early age of seven, at which time the presumption of incapacity dissi-
pated.107
Insanity and drunkenness are more fruitful areas of inquiry. The
09 See Bell, supra note 52, at 36.
100 Not unreasonably, LaFave & Scott refer to this defence as a justification: supra
note 63, at 377. Cf. Miller, Criminal Law (St. Paul: West, 1934) (classified as an
excuse).
101 Miller, id. at 168, classifies this defence as an excuse.
102 As opposed to negligent acts where incapacity would obviously be more easily
feigned and difficult to disprove.
103 See Hart, "Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment," in Punishment and
Responsibility, supra note 18, at 44.
104 See e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. §§33-402-33-407 (requiring insane defendants or their
relatives to pay for the cost of institutionalization).
105 E.g., Borders v. U.S., 256 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1958).
106 Binavince, The Ethical Foundations of Criminal Liability (1964-65), 33 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 1 at 18.
107 State v. Milholland, 89 Iowa 5, 56 N.W. 403 (1893).
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M'Naghten08 test of insanity as initially posited is an example of the first
principle of authority exercised in its most extreme form. The issue was not
whether the defendant was insane but rather whether the insanity was of a sort
that prevented the defendant from challenging the state's authority. Thus, if
the defendant had been aware or could be presumed to have been aware of
the fact"" that the conduct was legally proscribed, the defence was unavailable
even though he was acting under some insane delusion that the conduct was
otherwise necessary. 10o The cognizance of the authority of the command in-
dicated to the courts that the contravention constituted disobedience in that
the authority was not seen by the insane defendant as a sufficient reason for
obedience in itself. Once the courts had reluctantly accepted the idea that
cognizance of the command was not necessarily an indicator of an ability to
conform with that knowledge, it was inevitable that authoritarian thought
would produce a test demanding an absolute inability to conform. This was a
test of irresistible impulse that could not be controlled even in the presence
of police officers."' The logic of authority is immutable: if the defendant had
the capacity to brood or the capacity to conform he also had a capacity to
obey. As he had a capacity to obey he also had a capacity to disobey, which in
turn meant that the state's authority was ultimately challenged by the conduct.
Those jurisdictions that have adopted tests premising culpability on an
ability to perceive the moral wrong of the conduct, together with a substantial
capacity to comply with that perception, have somewhat alleviated the press
of the first principle. These tests, however, are still concerned with the defen-
dant's disobedience rather than with whether he is in fact insane.1 2 This dif-
ference in emphasis is illustrated by a comparison of a liberal version of the
Model Penal Code test"3 with that of the ill-fated Durham test."14 Durham,
in a somewhat Hegelian conceptualization, asks whether the disease produced
the act. It focuses on the insanity of the defendant and the relationship of that
insanity to the defendant's conduct. Thus, by ignoring questions of cognition
and control the test fails to raise the issue of disobedience altogether. The
Model Penal Code, on the other hand, still tests insanity in terms of disobe-
dience-albeit at a potentially lower standard than that of M'Naghten. The
108 M'Naghten's Case (1843), 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 E.R. 718 (H.L.).
109 The Judges in M'Naghten were anxious to point out that even with the insane,
mistake of law is no defence: id. at 210 (Cl. & Fin.), 723 (E.R.).
11OE.g., State v. Andrews, 187 Kan. 458, 357 P.2d 739 (1961); R. v. Windle, [1952]
2 Q.B. 826, [1952] 2 All E.R. 1, 36 Cr. App. Rep. 85 (C.C.A.). Another version of
rational insanity reasoning is that which would permit the defence if the defendant's
conduct would have been justified had the delusion itself been a reality: e.g., Freeman
v. State, 132 Ga. App. 742, 209 S.E.2d 127 (1974).
11 U.S. v. Kunak, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 346, 17 C.M.R. 356 (1954). See also Herron v.
State, 287 So.2d 759 cert. denied, 417 U.S. 972 (Miss. 1974).
112 "So long as there is any chance that the preventive influence may operate, it is
essential to maintain the threat. If it is not maintained, the influence of the entire system
is diminished upon those who have the requisite capacity, albeit that they sometimes
may offend.": Wechsler, The Criteria of Criminal Responsibility, (1954-55) 22 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 367 at 374; see, e.g., U.S. v. Ettorre, 387 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
113 Model Penal Code, (10 U.L.A.) §4.01.
114 Durham v. U.S., 214 F.2d 862, 45 A.L.R.2d 1430 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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test is whether the defendant lacks a "substantial capacity either to appreciate
the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law." 11 To the extent that the defendant must meet the fact
finders' concept of substantial capacity, the test is objective and its rigour in-
determinate. Nor is it determined whether the defendant must have substan-
tial capacity to appreciate the legal or moral wrongness of his conduct. Those
jurisdictions that have adopted a moral wrong test have significantly lowered
the standard of disobedience required for culpability; however, it is still a test
of disobedience. Thus, the court adopts what it believes to be the defendant's
moral standard and holds him to it. Ultimately, the result of the test is that
authority is exercised against those who are insane but who have a substantial
capacity to obey the command even though absent their insanity they might
not have acted as they did. The Durham test attempts not to punish in this
latter case.
With intoxication the position is much the same. The question is whether
the defendant's conduct constituted disobedience to the state regardless of his
impaired or aberrational status. The issue of disobedience is again determined
by the import of the command. Thus, if the command forbids conscious per-
formance of a particular act, and the defendant, though intoxicated, con-
sciously performed it, the conduct constitutes disobedience regardless of the
fact that the defendant would have acted differently if he were sober.116
Similarly, if the command is to maintain a particular standard of care or to be
aware of certain laws, the defendant's voluntarily depriving himself of the
capacity to meet the standard is simply another form of disobedience that is
prohibited.117 On the other hand, the command may prohibit a premeditated
determination to disobey the state" 8 or it may prohibit conduct generated by a
specific intent."x9 If the intoxication is perceived in either case as having pre-
vented the defendant from compassing the command as given, the conduct will
not constitute disobedience no matter how harmful it may have been. Such
conduct is interpreted as not questioning the state's authority simply because
it falls outside the parameters of the command. From the perspective of mor-
ality it is difficult to differentiate these cases; however, from the perspective of
authority the distinction is clear.
The capacity defences indicate the intensity of the state's need to vin-
dicate its authority, even against those with limited capacity to obey. The
aberrational quality of the conduct and the reduced mental status of the de-
fendant mean little if disobedience, sometimes under the most stringent of
standards, is seen to be present in the conduct in question.
116 Model Penal Code, (10 U.L.A.) §4.01.
110 LaFave & Scott, supra note 63, at 342; Wharton, 1 Criminal Law and Procedure
(Brooklyn: Foundation, 1957). This rule is also implicit in the refusal to accept the
defence in cases where the defendant "blanked out": Bishop v. U.S., 107 F.2d 297 (D.C.
Cir. 1939); People v. Kelly, 10 Cal.3d 565, 516 P.2d 875, 111 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1973).
117 People v. Garcia, 250 Cal. App.2d 15, 58 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1967); Embry v.
State, 310 P.2d 617 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957).
118 E.g., State v. Wilson, 234 Iowa 60, 11 N.W.2d 737 (1943); Commonwealth v.
Rogers, 351 Mass. 522, 222 N.E.2d 766 (1967).
119 U.S. v. Scott, 529 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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When one considers the excuses of the criminal law, the press and para-
dox of authority are again vividly exposed. Excuses, unlike justifications, are
admitted violations of the criminal law that the state does not punish; the
conduct is wrong but defensible. Why, then, would the state excuse? Profes-
sor Fletcher, once more taking the issue outside of the context of state au-
thority, answers that excuses excuse because of the existence of a special
condition that arouses compassion; 20 that the wrongful act reflects a limited
temporal distortion of the actor's character' 21 and that in some sense the
wrongful act was involuntary. 22 It has been shown that in some cases of
insanity the state is prepared to punish even where there is a limited capacity
to obey. With drunkenness it punishes temporary distortions. Moreover, com-
passion in general plays little part in the determination of guilt. 123 In fact,
when considered from the perspective of morality, excuses make somewhat
of a poor showing.
Some excuses are in fact not excuses at all but are in reality simply ex-
planations which, if accepted, should negate wrongdoing absolutely. With
mistake of fact, for instance, the defendant explains that his conduct did not
in any way correlate with his mental perception of surrounding circumstances.
It is suspicion that puts the defendant in a defensive posture and requires
him to indicate to the state that the conduct was not in fact authority-ques-
tioning. Once this is shown, the conduct is simply not wrong.
12 4
Insofar as mistake of law is concerned, the judiciary has, for the most
part, been prepared to impose the burden of knowledge on society and has
pressed the authority of the state to the extent of permitting conviction de-
spite a legitimate and honest mistake.'2 When the defence has been held to
be available it is because knowledge was perceived to be an element of the
command or because the defendant was responding to the state's authority in
a more immediate fashion by acting in accordance with the instructions of
one of its officials. 126 In both mistake of law and mistake of fact, therefore,
the mistake causes the conduct to fall outside the parameters of the command.
In situations in which there is, in fact, a perception of the criminality of
the act, one finds the state responding in a morally paradoxical fashion. Thus
120 Fletcher, supra note 5, at 808.
121d. at 802.
122 Id. at 802-806.
12 3 See R. v. Dudley and Stephens (1884), 14 Q.B.D. 273 at 280, [1881-85] All
E.R. Rep. 61 at 67-68, 52 L.T. 107 at 113, where Lord Coleridge makes the much
maligned statement: "We are often compelled to set up standards we cannot reach our-
selves, and to lay down rules which we could not ourselves satisfy." See also Everett,
supra note 22; Kelly, supra note 116, for the effect of compassion on punishment but
not guilt. For the inefficacy of compassion, see Starks, supra note 92, and cases cited
at note 22, supra.
124 People v. Chavira, 3 Cal. App. 973, 83 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1970); People v.
Famalett, 346 N.Y.S.2d 957, 75 Misc.2d 360 (Dist. Ct. 1973).
125 U.S. v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Hopkins v. State, 193 Md. 489,
69 A.2d 456 (1949); State v. Western Union Tel. Co., 12 N.J. 468, 97 A.2d 480 (1953);
People v. Bock, 69 Misc. 543, 125 N.Y.S. 301 (Co. Ct. 1910) afl'd, 148 App. Div.
899; Koczwara, supra note 91; Manahan, supra note 94.
126 LaFave & Scott, supra note 63, at 356, 368.
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while crimes motivated by noble sentiment receive short shrift,127 conduct
produced through base fear will on occasion be excused.' 28 Another oddity is
the fact that while fear produced through duress will excuse most crimes other
than homicide,129 provoked anger will excuse no crime but will mitigate a
homicide.130 One would think that logically there would be little reason for
distinguishing between emotional states that distort the defendant's character,
particularly when they are reasonable responses to events outside of the
defendant's control. Another peculiarity is that while most courts have ac-
cepted duress as an excuse, there has been some reluctance to accept neces-
sity as a justification. 131 This difference is odd because in the former case the
defendant is acting, albeit unwillingly, to achieve the larger criminal goal of
his coercer whereas in the latter he is not. However, when these defences are
viewed from the authority perspective of the two principles enunciated
above, 32 the paradoxes resolve themselves.
Duress and provocation are, in fact, excellent examples of the tension
created between the state's need to vindicate its authority and its need to pro-
tect itself from unavoidable disobedience. The force of the first principle,
however, tends to ensure that the second will take effect only in narrowly de-
fined circumstances.
Insofar as duress is concerned, it is logical that an institution that relies
on threats of pain and suffering for obedience will be more susceptible to a
defence that is based on fear than to one based on altruistic motivation. The
judiciary, therefore, treats the defence initially as a contest between competing
authorities. Thus, the coercer must exceed the state in terms of ferocity of
threatened punishment for disobedience 33 and the danger must be imme-
diately impending'34 so that if it is removed the authority of the state is ex-
127 See note 22, supra.
128 LaFave & Scott, supra note 63, at 374.
1-9 Id. at 375-76.
130 Id. at 572.
'3' U.S. v. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336 (D. Md. 1968); Marley, supra note 22;
Frasher v. State, 8 Md. App. 439, 260 A.2d 656 (1970); Commonwealth v. N.Y. Cent.
& H.R.R. Co., 202 Mass. 394, 88 N.E. 764 (1909); People v. Brown, 70 Misc.2d 224,
333 N.Y.S.2d 342 (Sup. Ct. 1972), Gann, supra note 22; Harris v. State, 486 S.W.2d
573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Butterfield v. State, 167 Tex. Crim. 64, 317 S.W.2d 943
(Tex. Crim. App. 1958); State v. Moe, 177 Wash. 303, 24 P.2d 638 (1933); Dudley
and Stephens, supra note 123. See Glazebrook, The Necessity Plea in English Criminal
Law (1972), 30 Camb. L.J. 87.
13 2 See text preceding note 99, supra.
'33 See, e.g., People v. Richards, 269 Cal. App.2d 768, 75 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1969);
People v. Hart, 98 Cal. App.2d 514, 220 P.2d 595 (1950). Cf. Gillars v. U.S., 182 F.2d
962 (D.C. Cir. 1950); People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App.3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110
(1975); Steane, supra note 96. See also People v. Moore, 40 Mich. App. 383, 198
N.W.2d 775 (1972); State v. Amundson, 69 Wis.2d 554, 230 N.W.2d 775 (1975); The
Model Penal Code, (10 U.L.A.) §2.09 provides the defence where the threat was such
that "a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist."
134 D'Aquino v. U.S., 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951); People v. Otis, 174 Cal. App.
119, 344 P.2d 342 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 1959); People v. Robertson, 543 P.2d 533 (Colo. App.
1975); Nall v. Commonwealth, 208 Ky. 700, 271 S.W. 1059 (1925).
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pected to reassert itself on the defendant. 135 Additionally, the defendant is
not to gratuitously'86 place himself in a position where this conflict of author-
ity can arise. 137 If he does so he is apparently culpable no matter how desir-
able the subsequent conduct may be.
The test, therefore, is one of competing threats with the state remitting
when the coercer's threats can be expected to have greater impact on the
defendant than its own. The remission only occurs, however, when the defen-
dant did not bring about the contest in the first place. Some courts have car-
ried this competing-fears concept to the extent that the defence is unavailable
when the defendant acts altruistically rather than in a fearful fashion. Thus,
they would prohibit the defence where the defendant acts to save the life of
someone other than himself or, in some instances, a close relative.138 Pre-
sumably, the logic is that the absence of immediate fear indicates the presence
of altruistic disobedience, which in turn questions the state's authority.
While fear is necessary for the defence, fear by itself will not suffice.
Not only must the threat be of a certain type, 30 but it must also be objectively
believable.140 If these standards are not met, the defence is unavailable no
matter how frightened the defendant actually was. 141 Once again the judiciary
has been prepared to impose the burden of obedience on those with a limited
capacity to obey.
In the competing-fear situation the second principle of authority is clearly
evident in the state's willingness to excuse only in narrowly defined circum-
stances in which it is believed that the defendant would not in any event have
obeyed the command. In some jurisdictions, however, a genuine fear produced
by significant threats will still not suffice to excuse. These are the jurisdictions
that will not admit duress as a defence in the case of serious crimes. 142 This
135 Lovercamp, supra note 133; Otis, id.; State v. St. Clair, 262 S.W.2d 25, 40
A.L.R.2d 903 (Mo. 1953); State v. Kearns, 25 N.C. App. 445, 213 S.E.2d 358 (1975).
136 Some courts have held this to be so even though the initial act was innocent.
See, e.g., R. v. Hurley, [1967] V.R. 526 (St. Ct. Vict.).
137 U.S. v. Agard, 605 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1979); State v. Patterson, 117 Or. 140,
241 p. 977 (1925). Model Penal Code, (10 U.L.A.) §2.09(2) provides that the defence
is not available where "the actor recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was
probable that he would be subject to duress." People v. Rodriguez, 30 II1. App.3d 118,
332 N.E.2d 194 (1975).
138See R.I. Recreation Center, supra note 22; Jackson v. State, 504 S.W.2d 448
(Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Hurley, supra note 35; LaFave & Scott, supra note 63, at 376.
19 I.e., violence of some sort: see Phillips v. U.S., 334 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1964);
People v. Patton, 25 111. App.3d 840, 322 N.E.2d 592 (1975); Patterson, supra note
137; Perkins, Criminal Law (2d ed. Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation, 1969) at 954; Model
Penal Code, (10 U.L.A.) §2.09(1).
140 Moore v. State, 23 Ala. App. 432, 127 So. 796 (1929); Model Penal Code (10
U.L.A.) §2.09(1).
141 Patrick, Starks, Villegas, supra note 92; Fuller, supra note 22.
142 LaFave & Scott, supra note 63, at 376, 377. The Model Penal Code, (10
U.L.A.) §2.09(1) and §210.6(4)(f), however, permits duress in the case of murder if
a person of reasonable firmness in the situation would have been unable to resist the
threat.
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caveat, coupled with the requirement of a genuine threat of death or serious
bodily injury if the defendant does not comply, results in a situation where
the defence is only admitted when the defendant essentially makes a valid
choice of competing evils. The defendant, therefore, will be excused only
when he could not reasonably be expected to obey the state's command and
when the act itself was objectively correct.
Some courts have limited the excuse even further in that they would ex-
culpate only in situations in which the coercer could be punished for the actual
offence committed. This limitation manifested itself in the rule, now aban-
doned,' 4 that the defence was available only if the defendant performed the
specific crime ordered by the coercer. 144 Although this particular rule is ex-
cessive, it should be noted that, unlike necessity, in the majority of duress
situations the state should have the coercer to punish for the breach and can
thus vindicate its authority in this fashion.
With duress, therefore, there is the situation where conduct that is not
particularly laudatory is exculpated primarily because the state believes it can-
not match the fear inspired by the coercer; but in any event, the defence is
limited to situations where the danger would objectively be considered signi-
ficantly serious and imminent. In some jurisdictions the defence also requires
that the choice of evils be a correct one. This hardly amounts to compassion
for temporary distortions of character.
When duress is compared with provocation, it would appear that, from
the perspective of a morality that is concerned with individual culpability,
little distinction could be drawn among reasonable responses to emotional
states produced by stimuli outside of the defendant's control. If the idea is, as
Professor Fletcher has suggested,14 that excuse is permitted because the de-
fendant's character was distorted by the circumstances, one might ask why
the evaluation should go further than determining that the stimuli was present
and that the distortion occurred. The actual result of a genuine emotional
response should be irrelevant.
From the perspective of authority, however, there are valid reasons for
distinguishing the two defences. As indicated by the duress defence, the state
will relax the demand for complete obedience only when there is reason for
doing so other than the likelihood that the defendant will not have the capacity
to obey. Thus with duress the state potentially has the coercer to punish for
the breach and when all the caveats are applied the conduct will, disobedience
aside, constitute a correct choice of evils. With provoked anger resulting in a
homicide, however, neither of these features will be present. There is no one
other than the defendant who can be held criminally responsible for the con-
duct. Moreover, the death of a human being through anger will inevitably
mean that the choice of evils was invalid. For these reasons and despite the
admitted incapacity of the defendant provocation will not excuse in the case
143 Lovercamp, supra note 133.
144 Richards, supra note 133; Rodriguez, supra note 137.
145 Fletcher, supra note 5, at 802.
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of homicide. This does not explain, however, why it mitigates when duress
does not; nor does it explain why lesser offences provoked by anger will not
be excused or punishment mitigated while the same offences, produced by
duress, will be exculpated completely.
The reasons for these apparent aberrations lie in the concept of authority
itself. In the case of a provoked homicide, for example, the victim will have
encouraged the breach of the peace (although not necessarily by criminal
conduct) 14 that brought about his demise. The victim's conduct, therefore,
is disturbing to the state in that it induced the authority-questioning conduct
of the defendant. In this sense, therefore, the defendant's conduct is marginally
beneficial to the state. In the case of a homicide produced by duress, however,
not even this marginal benefit is present since the victim in the majority of
cases will be an innocent cause of the crime.
The defence of provocation producing a lesser offence is unavailable
because, if the defendant was sufficiently in control to avert the homicide, he
was sufficiently in control to obey the state. Thus, while the second principle
of authority will produce a mitigation in the case of uncontrollable fury, the
first principle will clamp down where control is evident. This result obtains
even though morally the defendant acts in a better fashion by exercising some
control than one who capitulates completely to a coercer and perpetrates the
same offence.
Those jurisdictions that have adopted the Model Penal Code's provisions
on duress 47 and provocation 48 have alleviated the imbalance to some extent.
Under the duress provision, coerced homicide will now excuse; however, the
defendant's conduct is still judged by objective standards. Provocation still
merely mitigates, and then only in the case of homicide. Slightly more logical
are those jurisdictions that mitigate both coerced and provoked homicide
rather than mitigating in one case and completely exculpating in the other. 149
Insofar as the defence of consent is concerned, the absence rather than
the presence of consent indicates the integral relationship of criminal conduct
to state authority. When the defence is available, it is because the absence of
consent is an element of the command; thus, the presence of consent draws
the conduct out of the parameters of the particular imperative so that the
defendant's conduct, even though immoral, does not constitute disobedience.Y0
When the command does not require absence of consent, however, there is no
defence. In the latter instance it is the authority-challenging nature of the con-
duct as determined by the command rather than its effect on the victim that
gives the act its criminal significance. Thus, once the state's authority is chal-
lenged, prior consent or subsequent condonation by the victim is obviously
irrelevant.
146 See Perkins, supra note 139, at 53-69, although in many cases the conduct of
the victim will be criminal.
'47 Model Penal Code, (10 U.L.A.) §2.09.
14 8 Id., §210.3(1) (b).
149 E.g., 40 Minn. Stat. Ann. §609.20 (West 1964); 41 Wis. Stat. Ann. §939.46(1)
(1958).
150 Don Moran v. People, 25 Mich. 356 (1872).
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Entrapment, on the other hand, presents an interesting example of the
state's telos working to such an extent that it begins to undermine the very
authority that it seeks to protect. In these cases the search for disobedience
reaches such an intensity that it begins to stimulate the very disobedience that
it seeks to check. It is an obvious corollary of the second principle of authority
that a state's authority is unnecessarily exposed when agents of the state en-
courage disobedience in those who had no intention of ever questioning that
authority.' 5 ' In some jurisdictions, the press of authority is such that disobedi-
ence even under these circumstances will meet with vindicatory action.152
From the perspective of the state, however, it is obviously the better position
to discourage this gratuitously destructive activity by refusing to convict in
cases in which the seeds of disobedience were not evident in the defendant.
The position on excuses can now be summarized. Some excuses are in
reality not excuses at all, in that the defendant has perpetrated no criminal
wrong. It is simply the suspicion of the state that puts the defendant in a
defensive posture requiring him to indicate in some way that his act was not
authority-challenging. 153 When genuine excuses are permitted, they tend to
be under circumstances in which it would be destructive of the state's author-
ity not to exculpate. Thus excuses may excuse so as to deter the state's own
agents from stimulating authority-challenging conduct themselves. Also, con-
duct may be excused because emotional pressures exist in the defendant to an
extent that makes obedience unlikely. In the latter case, however, the state
with judicial assistance will tend to exculpate completely only in narrowly de-
fined circumstances in which it can vindicate the breach against another and
where the choice of evils will be a valid one. In addition to these stringent
requirements, objective tests are employed so that those who are factually in-
capable of obedience are judged by standards that they cannot possibly meet.
When there are no significant benefits to the state in the exculpation, the most
that can be expected-even in the case of a reasonable emotional response-is
a mitigation of the punishment.
In terms of punishment there is obviously little to distinguish a justifica-
tion from an excuse. In either case, the successful plea will exculpate. From
the perspective of morality and authority, however, the distinction is an im-
portant one. Thus, in the case of an excuse the defendant's conduct is deemed
to be wrong but not punishable. 15 4 With a justification, however, the adjudi-
cator commends, or at least asserts that what the defendant did was correct
and proper. 55 From a moral point of view, it is better to be justified than
excused. From the perspective of authority, however, the position is the re-
verse. The state can excuse and still assert that its authority is a sufficient
reason for obedience; the conduct is still deemed wrong, but punishment is
simply remitted. With justification, on the other hand, validating the act im-
151 Sherman v. U.S., 356 U.S. 369, 2 L. Ed.2d 848 (1958).
152 Goins v. State, 192 Tenn. 32, 237 S.W.2d 8 (1951).
153 Patterson v. N.Y., 432 U.S. 197, 53 L. Ed.2d 281 (1971).
154 Hart, supra note 103, at 13-14; Austin, A Plea for Excuses (1956-57), 57 Proc.
Aristotelian Soc'y 1.
155 Hart, id.; Austin, id.
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plies that the authority may be legitimately contravened. It is important, there-
fore, to determine under what circumstances the state will justify the abroga-
tion of its command.
When viewed from the perspective of the state's authority, justifiable
contraventions of the criminal law tend to be acts that will support rather than
abrogate that authority. The justifiable act tends to be one that the state would
have ordered, either because it is directed against one who is acting against
the authority of the state by committing a criminal act, or because the conduct
is seen as in some other way beneficial to the state's power structure. More-
over, the ulterior intent with which the defendant acts in many of these cases
will cause the conduct to fall outside the parameters of the command in ques-
tion.
The primary example of acts directed against wrongdoers or other
enemies of the state in support of the state's authority are, of course, acts
done in the furtherance of public order. These are either the acts of agents of
the state or acts done at their direction.' 60 A more indirect support of authority
is that derived from self-defence, defence of others and defence of property.
For the most part the victim in these cases will be someone engaged in crim-
inal conduct so that the defendant's act is one that the state itself would prob-
ably have ordered.st The defendant's motivation is not, of course, to support
the state, but to defend some interest. This factor, however, will tend to make
the conduct only marginally authority-questioning. 18 It is the suspicion of the
state that puts the defendant in the defensive posture that requires him to
indicate that the conduct did not constitute disobedience but was motivated
primarily by the defensive intent. In addition to these two features, there re-
mains the fact that overriding personal interests will often be concerned so
that in the majority of cases it will be unlikely that a state command prohibit-
ing the conduct will be obeyed.
The concern of the state for its own interest rather than the position of
156 LaFave & Scott, supra note 63, at 389, 402-407.
157 The requirement in all three defences is that the conduct be directed against
what the defendant reasonably believed to be an unlawful assault or an unlawful tres-
pass. This will tend to mean that the act will be directed against a criminal act: Com-
monwealth v. Edwards, 448 Pa. 79, 292 A.2d 361 (1972); LaFave & Scott, supra note
63, at 391-402. It may, however, be directed against conduct that is purely tortious or
even innocent if the defendant misperceived the situation. In this regard it is interesting
to note that the early common law distinguished between justifiable crimes and those
that are simply excusable. Those that were justified were: the execution of a sentence
of death pronounced by a competent tribunal; the killing of an enemy on the field of
battle as an act of war and within the rules of war; arresting a felon, preventing his
escape or recapturing him after escape and preventing the commission of a felony per-
petrated by violence or surprise. Typical instances of excusable homicide were killings
by misadventure by a madman and certain kinds of homicides committed in self-defence.
See Perkins, supra note 139, at 892. In all cases now, however, the conduct will still be
that which the state would order its officers to resist either because of its criminal or
dangerous quality.
158 The true nature of the defendant's conduct in cases of self-defence, defence of
property and defence of others is that he is defending; the conduct, therefore, ipso facto,
is not an attack on state authority other than in the sense that the defendant may be
aware that under normal circumstances his conduct would be impermissible.
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the defendant is still evident here. With self-defence, for example, if the de-
fendant disobeyed the state by initiating the assault and the victim responded
reasonably, it matters not that the defendant's conduct ultimately became
motivated by self-preservation. 59 Also, if the defendant's response in any of
these defences is deemed unreasonable, the fact that he actually believed that
the conduct was necessary becomes, if anything, merely a mitigating factor. 10
These considerations again can result in the punishment of mistaken altruism
and where there is genuine incapacity to obey.
The concern that the victim may be, in fact, an authority-challenger has
led courts on occasions to deny these defences when the defendant responded
reasonably but the victim was in fact acting lawfully.'"' The tendency now,
however, is to validate reasonable responses.l' 2 These defences, therefore,
have two aspects that make them justified in the eyes of authority. First, they
are directed against an individual who appears to be challenging the authority
of the state. Second, because defendants tend to be motivated primarily by an
intent to preserve a legitimate interest-life or property-they will at most
contravene the command in a purely formal sense. In addition, the threat to
the interests involved will, in the majority of cases, make it unlikely that a
command to the contrary would be obeyed. Such is the press of the state's
authority, however, that again courts were at times not prepared to admit
justifiable acts against wrongdoers that were motivated purely by altruism.
The absence of self-interest indicated paradoxically that the conduct was
challenging authority because of the capacity in the defendant to conform to
the law. Thus, as with duress, defence of others was sometimes limited to
close relatives. 1
3
Bearing in mind the beneficial aspects of self-defence, defence of others
and defence of property to the state's authority it is useful to consider those
justifications when the victim is not a wrongdoer but where the state per-
ceives itself to have benefited in some other fashion. This situation arises with
the defence of domestic authority and necessity. Little need be said about the
former defence. It is clear that the authority of the state is benefited when
discipline is maintained among juveniles and others by those immediately
responsible for them. To this end, the state permits reasonable force to be
159 Thus, self-defence is said to be available only when the original attack of the
defendant was not felonious: Commonwealth v. Blackman, 446 Pa. 61, 285 A.2d 521
(1971). If the initial attack of the defendant was not of a felonious nature but the vic-
tim responded unreasonably, the defendant because of his own culpability is not always
completely exculpated but rather the offence is reduced to manslaughter. See State v.
Gordon, 191 Mo. 114, 89 S.W. 1025 (1905). Cf. Model Penal Code, (10 U.L.A.)
§3.04(2) (b), which would allow a perfect self-defence in this situation.
'CO E.g., Burton v. State, 254 Ark. 673, 495 S.W.2d 841 (1973). In these cases the
honesty of the belief that the conduct was necessary negates malice and thus takes the
conduct out of the parameters of the command. Some jurisdictions even in this type of
case, however, would condemn the conduct as murder: e.g., People v. Manzo, 9 Cal.2d
594, 72 P.2d 119 (1937).
161 E.g., People v. Johnson, 2 ll.2d 165, 117 N.E.2d 91 (1954); People v. Young,
11 N.Y.2d 274, 183 N.E.2d 319 (1962).
162 E.g., Young, id.; see also LaFave & Scott, supra note 63, at 398.
163 LaFave & Scott, id. at 393, 399.
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used to carry out those responsibilities. More problematical is the defence of
necessity. Conduct that falls within the purview of this defence may be moti-
vated by self-interest, as when the defendant perpetrates a crime to avert
some natural calamity about to befall him;'64 or, it may be motivated by pure
altruism, as when he commits the offence for the benefit of others.'05 What-
ever its basis, the defence has not always been accepted by the courts.' 0 The
reason for this lack of acceptance is apparent. The conduct, by definition, will
not be directed against a wrongdoer who is himself challenging the state's
authority. Similarly, if there are no personal interests involved, the conduct
becomes suspect for its lack of compulsion. Finally, unlike duress, there is no
one against whom the state can vindicate its authority, except the defendant.
Set off against this is the fact that emergencies will arise where valuable in-
terests can be saved only by conduct abrogating a command. The press of
authority, however, is such that there is an inherent reluctance to admit openly
that even in these cases the command may validly be contravened-hence
the disparagement of the defence.1'7
Where the defence is accepted, it is so narrowly circumscribed that it pre-
vails only in cases in which the state has not made a clear value choice, the
value choice of the defendant was objectively correct and the danger was im-
mediately impending so that the state could not itself act. The conduct, of
course, must be motivated by a desire to achieve the benefit gained. 168 These
limitations tend to make the defence available only in situations in which the
defendant acts as an officer of the state would have acted had he been present
to deal with the crisis.
Justifiable conduct can now be summarized. It is conduct that either di-
rectly or indirectly supports the authority of the state instead of challenging it.
It supports authority primarily because it is conduct that the state directs or
would have directed its agents to perform had they been present at the time of
the event. For the most part, the conduct is directed against individuals who
are themselves breaking the criminal law. Once again, however, the press of
the state's authority is apparent. If the advantages do not accrue, as when the
victim could not reasonably have been a wrongdoer, or if authority is in fact
challenged, as when the beneficial result is achieved fortuitously, then the
defence will not prevail regardless of societal benefit or individual incapacity.
When one considers the general defences of the criminal law as a whole,
164 Moore, supra note 141; see also id. at 397; Miller, supra note 100, at 216.
165 E.g., Bourne, supra note 96.
166 As in the classical case of Dudley and Stephens, supra note 123.
1'7 See text accompanying note 131, supra.
108 This was the view expressed by the Criminal Law Commission of 1845: Second
Report, Parl. Pap. (1846) XXIV 107, Art. 19. See also Hale, 1 Historia Placitorum
Coronae (Philadelphia: Small, 1847) at 54; Blackstone, 4 Commentaries, at 32. The
drafters of the Model Penal Code have included a choice of evils defence in §3.02,
which at least nine states have accepted in varying forms. See 8 Colo. Rev. Stat. §18-
1-702 (1978); 7 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §463 (1953); 7A Hawaii Rev. Stat. tit. 37,
§703-302 (1976); Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 38, §7-13 (Smith-Hurd 1973); 16 Ky. Rev. Stat.
§503.030 (1975); N.Y. Penal Law §35.05(2) (McKinney 1975); Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
tit. 18, §503 (Purdon 1973); Tex. Penal Code tit. 1, §9.22 (Vernon 1974); Wis. Stat.
Ann. §939.47 (West 1957).
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it is apparent that there is little weakness in this area of the imperative of the
criminal law. The insane, the intoxicated, the mistaken and the emotionally
disturbed are similarly scrutinized for disobedience, sometimes under the
severest of standards. The reasonable and the abjectly unreasonable are alike
sacrificed for the benefit of the authority of the state. When benefits accrue
and authority is vindicated, capitulating fear is excused while controlled anger
is punished. Altruism is always suspect. Justifiable breaches of the law, in
reality, support rather than challenge the authority of the state. When one
considers these meagre defences and the standards under which they have
been admitted, the judiciary rather than constituting a moral brake to the
carriage of the state appear rather as its postillions stringently maintaining the
velocity of its telos. In this regard, one must not be misled by the cases where-
in courts invoke constitutional provisions to restrain legislative and executive
activity in the criminal sphere, as this is authority rather than morality at
work. As indicated above,169 implicit in a distribution of powers is the idea
that the impetus of authority will lead individual functionaries to resist the
encroachments of others and in so doing restrain the general telos of the state
from bearing down on society as a whole. The extent to which this is achieved
is obviously an important question but outside the purview of this paper. It
is interesting to note, however, that when the conflict occurs the moral posi-
tion of the defendant tends to become irrelevant.'7 Also, as might be expected,
the strictures imposed by the judiciary on the legislature vis-a-vis society will
not always correlate with those that they impose on themselves when defend-
ing societal assaults on their position.171 Similarly on other occasions the am-
bivalence created by conflicting authority goals becomes manifest when a con-
stitutional doctrine conflicts with a major general premise of authority. 172
V. CONCLUSION
It is implicit from the position taken in this paper that the writer con-
siders that the retreat of positivism from the position of Austin may have gone
too far. It is true, as Hart has pointed out, that some laws simply regulate the
internal operations of the state and that others are simply intended to guide
individuals in their conduct and, to this end, are choice-oriented. 173 The crim-
inal laws, however, intrinsically constitute commands issuing from the state
to society, denying choice and demanding obedience. The psychological nexus
that concerned both Kelsen 174 and Hart175 is supplied in a passive form by the
10 See text accompanying note 52, supra.
170 E.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 51 L. Ed.2d 424 (1977).
171 U.S. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 530 U.S. 258, 91 L. Ed. 884 (1947).
172 E.g., Lambert v. Cal., 355 U.S. 225, 2 L. Ed.2d 228 (1957). Initially, Douglas
1. framed the question for decision in terms of ignorance, asking whether due process
permits criminal liability for a person who lacked probable and "actual knowledge" oi
the violated statute. Immediately, however, the focus of the opinion turned to the
question of mens rea. The felon-registration ordinance did not specify an intent require-
ment, and Mr. Justice Douglas declared that, as a general rule, criminal statutes need
not require intent.
173 Hart, supra note 1, at 26-48.
174 See Kelsen, supra note 18, at 55.
175 Hart, supra note 1, at 54.
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linguistic rule-following tendencies of functionaries and in an active form by
their desire to maintain their own authority by maintaining the authority of
the state. The will that gives the command its psychological force is evidenced
by the policeman apprehending, the prosecutor prosecuting, the judge convict-
ing and the gaoler punishing. Its strength is indicated by the reluctance of
these functionaries to vitiate the categoric nature of the imperative, or if they
do so, to do it in a clandestine fashion. Insofar as the legitimacy of the au-
thority of the state is concerned, it is asserted here that it is derived from the
perennial consistency of sanctioning rather than from the transient supporting
dogma. In reality, therefore, when stripped of its miranda 170 the only distinc-
tion between the authority of the robber and the authority of the state is that
the ascendancy of one is temporary while the ascendancy of the other is per-
manent. Indeed, the state itself implicitly recognizes its substantial similarity
with the robber in the manner in which it deals with situations of duress.
This portrayal appears to paint an excessively black picture, but such a
conclusion is not intended. One must recognize that the force of the state's
authority, brought about by the authority-biased, linguistic rule-following ten-
dencies of its functionaries, will mean that the positive law will tend to be the
law that will ultimately prevail. This result does not mean that the law itself
must necessarily be a bad law, or that where interpretation is possible the law
will be interpreted in a wicked manner. The morality of the law's application
is determined by the intelligence, diligence, and moral worth of the function-
aries creating and applying the rules. Natural law philosophy, however, seems
to premise the whole of its thought on the idea that good laws make good
people and that morally sound laws will produce a morally sound society.
This premise is held even though history consistently has shown that the
same constitution can be used for evil as well as for good. The reality is, in
fact, the reverse. It is good people that make good laws; the essential im-
portance lies not in the positive laws themselves but in the moral qualities of
those who create and administer them. Rather than urging that morally un-
sound laws are not laws at all, we should urge those who create and administer
them to do so in a morally sound manner. For ultimately, it is, after all, the
letter that killeth and the spirit that giveth life. 177
176 See Merriam, Political Power (New York: Collier, 1964) at 109. "Miranda" is
used by Merriam to describe the symbols of power with which the state adorns itself.
It means literally "things to be admired."
177 See 2 Corinthians 3:6.
[VOL. 19, No. 2
